time to the opportunities offered by the new technologies in transport and communication, that allow to "come and go" between new countries of settlement and places of origin, a growing number of societies, in Europe and abroad, will become in turn "knots in a post-national network of diasporas", in an ever more global and post-national context. Empirical data, to make a few examples, testify already to this new configuration of the world. Europe, from which during the 19 th century at least 70 million people have emigrated, can count today in the world about 480 million descendants of Europeans. Italy, with 60 million inhabitants, has an estimated diaspora of 80 million people. The Chinese diaspora is estimated to amount to 40 million people. The Indian one to 20-30 millions. A small country like Lebanon, with 4 million inhabitants, counts beyond its boundaries in the various continents 14 million Lebanese and their descendants. All the diasporas, those mentioned as an example and the many others that are roaming the world, have taken on in the course of time a subjectivity and also a weight in social and international relations which are increasingly visible and meaningful. A sign of the visibility and subjectivity is given by the presence of diasporas in the virtual networks. An international research started in 2003 (E-Diaspora Atlas, published by Maison des Sciences de l'Homme of Paris in 2012) has recorded the presence online of 28 diasporas, with their websites, their forums, their "social media". And as far as their role and weight (actual and, more importantly, potential) is concerned, it is significant that in May 2011 the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton contributed to create IDEA (International Diaspora Engagement Alliance), a non-profit and non-partisan organization in the form of a public-private partnership between the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Calvert Foundation, with the aim to promote the role, engagement and interconnection of all diasporas. Clearly, the initiative is oriented in the first place to the interests and the foreign policy of the United States, but still it is not less meaningful for appreciating the increasing role and weight of diasporas both in practice and in collective perception.
But what are diasporas in practice? What is the peculiarity that determines their role and identity? Its condition has been tellingly defined as a condition of tension between the "where you come from" and the "where you are now". Those living in diaspora have a "hyphenated identity" (one is Indo-American, Turk-German, Italo-American, Franco-Algerian, etc.), have multiple belongings, practice several languages and cultures, often have several citizenships. Thus, the identity problem is central in such a condition. Identity is quite clearly not given, but built up, relational (built in the relationship with others), process-driven, plural, since one practices and perceives at the same time several identity-related dimensions. In the words of the Italian writer Claudio Magris, "An authentic identity resembles a matryoshka set, where each doll contains another one and can be inserted in turn in a bigger one". As happens to everybody, only in a more particular and acute way, the people in diaspora experience the "paradox of identity": identity offers a sense of cohesion and belonging, but at the same time divides between "us" and "the others", it hangs always in a difficult balance between those two possibilities. Indeed, this complex condition, briefly outlined here, explains what the cultural and social role of diasporas is, and above all what it could become. Diasporas, as has been said, open negotiation spaces among cultures. "It is an alternative to the metaphysics of race, nation, a delimited territorial culture […] it is a concept that disturbs the historical and cultural mechanisms of belonging" (Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness, London, Verso, 1993) . From that viewpoint, the subjectivity of diasporas, should it emerge and mature, may contribute to the dialog among civilizations, to the coexistence within societies and States and between different societies and different States. Diasporas, in short, are functional to the logic of bridges, not to that of walls, which is instead typical of societies and States dominated by fear, which in history is usually a forerunner of conflicts and wars.
In the context and perspective outlined so far, the necessity is apparent to rethink the problem of statehood, of democracy, of the federal project itself embodied for the first time in the American Constitution of 1787. In this beginning of the 21 st century, when it seems that a kind of permanent, global civil war has started, managed by private actors (international terrorism, organized crime, etc.) and public actors (the States and their more or less "preemptive" wars), we are faced with a decisive existential challenge: how to make ever more diverse and hybridized human groups coexist peacefully and with mutual convenience, according to the mechanisms of democracy and consensus, on the same territory and under a common political authority? Constitutionalism of the 21 st century, more specifically, is faced with an equally decisive challenge: how to guarantee, with what procedures and institutional devices, a political unity overarching all the differences, and, inversely, how to still preserve those differences in that political unity? And the federalist thought, in particular, how can it consider within its horizon the unprecedented "segmentation", of which trans-national diasporas are an exemplary but not unique case, that somehow disarticulates and breaks up societies and States? A foedus (a compact) between several States willing to share their sovereignty in a multilevel architecture from the local to the global, is historically at the base of the federalist project. But how to realize that between fragmented, disarticulated, hybridized States? Such a foedus must in turn be articulated in supplemental compacts having cultural, in addition to institutional aspects; be turned into a complex constitutionalization process of the plurality of identities, belongings and citizenships which are bound to coexist in the same place and under the common authority. There is to tackle demands of recognition of many collective identities, in a shared spirit of mutual exchange; to guarantee fundamental public goods (peace, safety, work, education, etc.) to all the segments composing the society, and simultaneously assure the unity of the polis under a common statehood. It must be very clear that the alternative is conflict, ethnic cleansing, war in that civilization and among civilizations. In sum, to highlight the pathetical obtusity of the supporters of the logic of walls and of the protection of one's identity against the coexistence of diversities, it would be the triumph of the strategies and dis-values of the transnational terrorists, whose purpose is precisely to build societies that are closed, ferociously identitybased, founded on a metaphysical contradistinction between "us" and "them".
This historic challenge, which the societies of the 21 st century are confronted with, comes about, at least and in particular in Europe, in the context of the waning of the great ideologies of the 1900s, which were giving a sense and a horizon, although inadequate, to the new times, to history and politics. It happens in a situation of crisis and in the twilight of the great political organizations (mass political parties, organizations mediating between individuals and the community, etc.) which to some extent were embodying great visions and were translating those in policies and programs; in a condition of crisis and reduction of social security systems (they too offspring of the 1900s), that were fueling the sense of belonging and mutual recognition, and in essence were the base of the legitimation of the common statehood; finally, in a situation of regression of the supra-national integration processes, of the return of xenophobic nationalisms, hence also of the increasing predominance of global economic powers over the national democracies, that by their very nature (since they are at a government level inadequate to tackle the global dimension of the current problems and actors) are impotent to control and govern them.
For the federal thought and the movements of federalist inspiration, a great theoretical activity and the possibility of conceiving new political projects open up, which require however to be available to innovation and to talk to other experiences and cultures. How to conceive and give political and operational form to a federalism concerning not only States, but also cultures and civilizations? How to give the federalist idea not only an institutional dimension, but also a cultural, anthropological, narrative one? How to build a multilevel and multicultural model of statehood able to answer the new problems of people's coexistence? Finally, to bring up again the theme of diasporas, how to make a valuable use, with a view to the goals outlined so far, of the great patrimony of experiences and cultures of these new trans-national and global actors? These are difficult and exacting questions which require however to be answered as soon as possible in order to guarantee peace and provide a credible perspective to political democracy. As often happens in history, the time available to give such answers risks in the end, while the players sit back unmindful, to become too short.
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